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THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE MILITARY SERVICE
Hon. Robert Emmett Quinn*
At a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Department
of Defense officials were questionea about certain alleged black market trans-
actions by American military personnel stationed in Turkey. It appeared that
a number of persons suspected of implication in the matter "took the fifth
amendment." One of the Senators reportedly said upon learning of the incident
that he was "very surprised" and "somewhat shocked that the military is afflicted"
with the fifth amendment.' Personally, I have, both privately and in my judicial
office, consistently maintained that an individual does not lose the rights and
privileges accorded him by the United States Constitution when he puts on a
uniform in the defense of his country, and the preservation of American ideals,
including the specific safeguards accorded an accused in criminal proceedings.2
There are those who vociferously advocate abolition or substantial curtailment
of such constitutional protections as the right against self-incrimination and the
right to confrontation of adverse witnesses, as essential to the future protection
of the law abiding against the lawless and the subversive. There are also those
who suggest that it is morally wrong to invoke the protections of the fifth amend-
ment when questioned about an act affecting the security of the country.'
Certainly, the host of labor officials, racketeers, and communist sympathizers who
invoked the amendment when questioned in congressional investigations stimu-
lated a profound reaction which caused many people to question the wisdom of
continuing the protection in all or special situations. While it may be doubtful
that the reaction will be sufficiently sustained in intensity or duration to achieve
a constitutional change, certain it is that it has produced a definite change in
society's attitude. Reliance upon the fifth amendment, for example, has been
* Chief judge, United States Court of Military Appeals.
1 Chicago Tribune, Mar. 24, 1960, p. 13, col. 1.
2 United States v. Williamson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 320, 15 C.M.R. 320 (1954).
3 McManus, The Natural Law and the Fifth Amendment, 3 CATHOLIC LAW. 61 (1957).
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used as a ground for dismissal from a teaching faculty of a public school and has
had similar results in private schools. If the "shock" of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in its inquiry into the Turkish black-market activities of
military personnel can be considered a barometer of Congressional sentiment,
"taking the fifth" for any reason may perhaps become a ground for terminating
an officer's commission, and involuntarily separating him from the service.4
As the form and content of human associations change, there is an adjust-
ment of the relations between the individual and the group. What seemed right
and appropriate in one period may appear wrong or dubious in another. How
many in present day America would proclaim it a grievous wrong to refuse to
encourage foreigners to migrate to this country? Yet, such refusal was one of the
"injuries and usurpations" charged to King George III in the Declaration of
Independence. Insofar as we believe that man is created in the image of God
and has, in the words of the Declaration of Independence, been "endowed by
[his] Creator with certain unalienable Rights" we must also believe that no
organizational form of human society can justly deprive that individual of his
God-given rights. True, the imperfection of human reason has, through the
centuries, resulted in unresolved controversy, and at times mortal conflict, over
the nature and scope of the divinely endowed rights, but the principle of indivi-
dual rights vis a' vis the group, is a necessary consequence of the belief in divine
creation.5 Insofar as the belief in God does not encompass the idea of inherent
rights, we must necessarily look to the group for the grant of rights and privileges
to the One against the Many. In other words as far as the modem nation-state
is concerned, if there is an individual right or privilege against the state, it must
be found in the will of the sovereign. Whatever our philosophy of law, we main-
tain that in the United States the Constitution guarantees to every human being
certain fundamental rights against both federal and state governments. Among
these are the familiar rights of the free exercise of religion and speech, the right
to be secure against unreasonable search and seizures, and the right to be free
from compulsory self-incrimination. The Founding Fathers were wise in the
ways of government. With an eye to the unknown future, they provided that the
enumeration of rights in the Constitution "shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people."'  Thus we have recognized the right to
be free from unreasonable intrusion of the Government into the teaching-learn-
ing experience,' and the right to travel to foreign countries.8
Constitutional rights are not dependent upon the vote of a shifting majority.9
4 See Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951); cf. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579
(1958).
5 In United States v. Williamson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 320, 15 C.M.R. 320 (1954), I referred
to the essentiality of this belief as follows.
The entire genius of our American institutions, the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights, the protections of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, all combine
to establish the truth of the aphorism "that a man's home is his castle." A
fortiori then, these inalienable rights, which are implicit in the Law of
Nature, and of Nature's God, demand that the sanctity of the human body,
made in the image and likeness of God- the temple of his immortal soul -
be and remain forever sacred and inviolate.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
7 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
8 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
9 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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But they are subject to the rule of reason. As Justice Holmes put it3 in his time
honored dictum, "the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect
a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic."'" In his Summa
Theologica, St. Thomas Aquinas reminds us that "human law proceeds from
the will of man regulated by reason." Time, place and circumstance are the
normal touchstones in determining the permissible extent of the limitation by
delegated authority on the rights of the individual. What is not permissible
under one set of conditions may be allowable under another. War or national
emergency may justify restrictions on the exercise of individual rights which
are intolerable in time of peace."
Service in the armed forces, in both war and peace, entails substantial
restriction on fundamental rights. To take an extreme example, in civilian life
we are free to work or not as we choose, in any legal job in any city of our desire.
But the military man is not free to pick the kind of duty he wants to perform,
or the place in which he wants to be. This is not to say that there is no choice
whatever. On the contrary, as the enlistment posters and the curricula of the
service academies show, there is a degree of free choice of duty; and career
personnel are informally allowed some discretion in the selection of the place of
duty. The freedom enjoyed, however, is not the freedom of a right which is
subject to restriction based only upon necessity. We may ask then: "Do persons
in the armed forces have any individual rights which are protected against un-
reasonable limitation or infringement by superior authority?"
Earlier, I noted that, in my opinion, the Constitution protects individuals
in the military as much as it protects persons in the civilian community. Indeed,
it is anomalous to say that aliens residing in the United States are entitled to
constitutional guarantees, 2 but that citizens of the United States in the service
of their country are deprived of those rights simply because they wear the uniform
of one of its military departments. Therefore, it is wholly inappropriate to say
that the military is "afflicted" with the Constitution. Be that as it may, Chief
Justice Vinson, speaking for four justices of the United States Supreme Court,
left no room to doubt the applicability of the Constitution to the military estab-
lishment. In his opinion in Burns v. Wilson, he said: "The military courts, like
the state courts, have the same responsibility as do the federal courts to protect
a person from a violation of his Constitutional rights.""-
A decade ago, Congress discarded its separate rules for the regulation of the
Army and Navy and enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice.' 4 The
Uniform Code governs the conduct of all persons in the armed forces, which
means the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Coast
Guard. Also included are personnel of the Public Health Service and the Coast
and Geodetic Survey and "other organizations, when assigned to and serving"
with the armed forces.' 5 Until the United States Supreme Court declared the
10 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
11 I do not intend to suggest that no constitutional right is absolute and that all are subject
to the limitations of time, place and circumstance.
12 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
13 346 U.S. 137 (1953). Only Justice Minton disagreed with this proposition.
14 10 U.S.C. § 801 (hereafter cited U.C.M.J.).
15 U.C.M.J. art. 2(8).
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provisions unconstitutional, Congress had also made employees of the armed
forces, and dependents of service personnel, outside the United States, subject to
the Uniform Code. 6
A violation of the Uniform Code is punishable by court-martial. There are
three kinds of courts-martial, the summary court, the special court, and the
general court, which try offenses of both a civilian and military nature." Each
of these courts is composed of military personnel. Putting aside technical nicety,
it may be said that the jurisdiction of each court depends upon its punishment
power. The general court-martial can impose any sentence, including death and
dishonorable discharge from the service, and, therefore, tries the so-called serious
offenses, such as murder, grand larceny, desertion, and willful disobedience of a
lawful order of a superior officer. The special court-martial cannot impose con-
finement at hard labor in excess of six months, and while it can impose a punitive
discharge, the type of discharge is restricted to a bad conduct discharge, which
in theory, if not in practical consequences, is somewhat less serious than a dis-
honorable discharge. 8 The greatest punishment that can be adjudged by a
summary court-martial is confinement for one month and forfeiture of two-
thirds of one month's pay. Every court-martial action is subject to review by the
military commander in the field. And every case in which he approves a punitive
discharge, whether dishonorable or bad conduct, must be further reviewed by
a board of review in the Office of The Judge Advocate General of the accused's
armed force. 9 The board of review must be composed of not less than three
members, who may be officers or civilians admitted to the bar of a federal or
state court. In practice, the boards of review of the Army and Air Force are
composed exclusively of military officers; in the Navy and Coast Guard, at least
one civilian is included on each board. Above the boards of review is the
United States Court of Military Appeals. This is the supreme court of the mili-
tary justice system. It is composed of three civilian judges appointed by the
president of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate. The
accused may appeal to the Court of Military Appeals in every case in which his
sentence, as approved by a service board of review, includes a punitive dis-
charge or confineinent at hard labor for one year or more.2" Consequently, the
Court of Military Appeals has the final responsibility in the military community
for determining whether there has been an unreasonable intrusion upon the
fundamental rights of the individual - at least to the extent that the intrusion
is made the basis for court-martial punishment.2 That responsibility might well
16 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Grisham
v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 280 (1960); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); for comment,
see 35 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 280 (1960).
17 See United States v. Fretwell, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 377, 29 C.M.R. 193 (1960). For a very
interesting article suggesting that the trial of civilian-type offenses by courts-martial in the
United States in time of peace is unconstitutional, see Duke and Vogel, The Constitution and
the Standing Army: Another Problem of Court-Martial's Jurisdiction, 13 VAND. L. REv. 435
(1960).
18 See United States v. Moore, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 687, 18 C.M.R. 311 (1955).
19 In peacetime, when the Coast Guard does not serve with the Navy, review of the action
of the convening authority is in the Office of the General Counsel of the Treasury Depart-
ment. U.C.M.J. art. 1(1)4.
20 U.C.M.J. art. 67.
21 Article 76 of the Uniform Code provides in part that the findings and sentence of
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extend beyond the military community in the event of an atomic attack on the
United States. Martial law would undoubtedly be imposed in large areas of the
country and the general court-martial sitting as a military tribunal administering
the laws of war might well be the only judicial body in operation.22 Considering
its present and potential responsibility in the administration of justice it is worth
examining some of the court's decisions relating to the personal rights of the
individual under military control.
The Right of Privacy in Military Quarters
Assigned quarters of military personnel vary considerably. On land, they
may consist of a many-roomed house, a modest apartment, or merely a cot and
locker in a barracks or a tent, which is shared with others. At sea, they may
consist of a suite, a small room, or a bunk and locker in the enlisted quarters.
Whatever the physical area of the assigned space, that place is "home" to the
military man. As such, it is not simply a place to sleep; rather it is a place
where the individual lives as a human being, possessed of an inherent right to be
free from the uninvited and unauthorized intrusion of others. The Court of
Military Appeals recognized this right in United States v. Adams.23
Adams was a private first class in the Army. He was stationed in Korea.
His batallion was assigned to a training exercise, and he was quartered in a tent
with several enlisted men. Early one evening, during a card game, Adams be-
came involved in a quarrel with Corporal Hughes. Hughes threatened to kill
him. Several soldiers separated the two, and Adams repaired to his tent. A
few minutes later Hughes came "tearing" at the front entrance, armed with fist-
sized rocks. Adams picked up his rifle and forced Hughes back toward the
tent entrance. Suddenly, Hughes seized a rifle and clip of cartridges. He in-
serted the latter into the gun. The muzzle of his rifle pointed at Adams. There-
upon, Adams "knocked the safety off" his own weapon and fired twice. One
of the bullets killed Hughes, the other passed through Adams' tent, entered
another and killed Sergeant Garcia. Adams was brought to trial before a
general court-martial on two charges of murder.
At the trial, Adams testified that Hughes had released the bolt on the
rifle that he had seized, and he knew that he "would have to shoot or [Hughes]
would have killed" him; he was "too scared" to run and he believed Hughes
would have shot him if he had. Trial counsel, the prosecuting attorney in a
military proceeding, in his argument to the court members - who are the
counterpart of the jury in the civilian court and are responsible for determining
the guilt or innocence of the accused - maintained that while the law excuses
a court-martial as approved on review "shall be final and conclusive upon all departments,
courts, agencies and offices of the United States." In Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953),
the Supreme Court noted that this provision does not prevent the regular civilian courts from
exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction to determine if there has been a violation of the accused's
constitutional rights, but the civilian courts have no power "simply to reevaluate the evidence."
The basis for review of a military court conviction seems to be no different from that of review
by habeas corpus of a conviction in the federal district court. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938).
22 See U.O.M.J. art. 18.
23 5 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 18 C.M.R. 187 (1955).
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a homicide in self-defense, it is limited by the doctrine of safe retreat, if the
accused is not in his own home or in a place where duty requires him to remain.
Trial counsel spelled out the meaning of a home in the military as follows:
A home is a dwelling, a place with walls and ceiling and furni-
ture and a roof, and we are not talking about a tent in which a
person lives somewhere else the next week. The accused had no
right to kill because he was in a tent in which he had a bunk. He
had no right to take a life.24
Trial counsel's definition was accepted by the law officer- who corresponds to
the judge in a civil trial. He instructed the court-martial that the "term 'house'
means presumptively, a dwelling, a house, and 'own' means belonging to one's
self.
On review a board of review in the Office of The Judge Advocate General
of the Army reduced the findings of guilty from murder to voluntary man-
slaughter, on the basis of the evidence, but it did not question the trial definition
of a home in the military sense. The accused appealed to the Court of Military
Appeals. The Court rejected completely the narrow definition of a home which
was accepted at the trial level. It said:
A dwelling house is not a mere physical structure of a particular
kind; it is a place in which human beings live. It may be a hotel
room, an apartment, an entire building, as in the case of a single
family residence, or a tent. State v. Holbrook, 98 Or. 43, 188 Pac.
947. Cf. United States v. Love, 4 USCMA 260, 15 CMR 260.
Generally a military person's place of abode is the place where he
bunks and keeps his few private possessions. His home is the
particular place where the necessities of the service force him to
live. This may be a barracks, a tent, or even a foxhole. Whatever
the name of his place of abode, it is his sanctuary against unlawful
intrusion; it is his "castle." And he is there entitled to stand his
ground against a trespasser to the same extent that a civilian is
entitled to stand fast in his civilian home. No reason in law, logic
or military necessity justifies depriving the men and women in the
armed forces of a fundamental right to which they would be
entitled as civilians. Consequently, when the accused retired to
his own tent, he retreated as far as the law demands. The law
officer erred in failing to make that clear to the members of the
court.
Implicit in Adams is the fact that subordination of rank or grade does not
qualify the right of privacy. The recruit has the same right to be free from
illegal intrusion as does the general or flag officer. This point was emphasized in
United States v. Hines,5 which came to the Court of Military Appeals about a
year after Adams. In Hines, the accused, a Technical Sergeant, lived with his
wife at Clark Air Force Base. One evening he became intoxicated at a pro-
motion party, and on returning home had an argument with his wife. She left
the house and went to the accused's commander, Major Whitten for help. The
Major did not want to intervene in a family affair because he had seen "many
cases" in which the commander attempted to straighten out differences of this
24 Id. at 568.
25 7 U.S.G.M.A. 75, 21 G.M.R. 201 (1956).
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kind only to have the wife eventually side with the husband and create "hard
feelings all the way around." Upon Mrs. Hines' continued demand, the Major
finally agreed to go to the house and talk to the accused. Lieutenant Colonel
Cronin went along with him. When they arrived at the accused's house, Major
Whitten called the accused's name several times from the outside, but received
no answer. As the Major reached for the handle of the screen door in the
front entrance he heard the bolt action of a carbine and a voice called out
"Don't move." Eventually, Major Whitten gained entrance to the house, and
found the accused with a loaded carbine. As a result of the incident, the
accused was tried and convicted by a court-martial of assaulting Major Whitten
and Colonel Cronin.
The Court of Military Appeals affirmed the conviction by a divided vote.
The point of division was whether Major Whitten was acting in an official or
private capacity. A majority of the court took the position that the Major was
acting as a commander called out to investigate a disturbance, and consequently
had just cause to enter the accused's quarters. On the other hand, the author,
in dissent, concluded that the evidence showed that the officers were acting in
a private capacity, and that the accused, therefore, had a lawful right to keep
"uninvited private persons out of his home." Both opinions, however, point up
the fact that merely because military quarters are assigned-to an individual on
a military installation, the military authorities do not have the right to enter
at will and without legitimate reason.
As far as the authority to search private quarters is concerned, the Court
of Military Appeals has followed closely the civilian rules. The principal differ-
ence between the military and civilian procedure relates to issuance of a warrant
by a federal judge or commissioner for proper cause. The military practice does
not provide for a warrant. In its place, however, is the requirement that the
search be authorized by the commanding officer, and that the authority to search
be shown by clear and competent evidence.2" The exercise of authority to
search must be predicated upon probable cause."
Freedom of Speech
Manifestly, service in an armed force imposes severe limitations on the right
to speak. The most obvious example is the restriction on the disclosure of security
information. Other limitations, which are evidently reasonable, are the
prohibition against the use of disrespectful language toward a superior officer,
and the use of contemptuous words against the principal civilian authorities.
The use of such language is made an offense in violation of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice.2" However, the right of the military superior to impose
silence upon his subordinates is not absolute. The Court of Military Appeals has
indicated in no uncertain terms that it will not countenance a limitation on the
individual's right to speak that is not essential to military discipline and order.
26 United States v. Gebhart, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 606, 28 O.M.R. 172 (1959); United States
v. Sessions, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 383, 27 G.M.R. 457 (1959).
27 United States v. Gebhart, 10 U.S.G.M.A. 606, 28 C.M.R. 172 (1959); United States
v. Brown, 10 U.S.O.M.A. 482, 28 C.M.R. 48 (1959).
28 U.O.M.J. art. 88, 89,91.
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Its working hypothesis is that long used by the United States Supreme Court in
the area of free speech, namely, that the freedom to speak under the Constitu-
tion "embraces two concepts -freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be."29  The right
to speak involves an accommodation of the right of the individual to the needs
of the community and the effect of the utterance.
In United States v. Voorhees, ° the accused wrote a book based upon his
experiences as a public information officer in Korea during the Korean conflict.
Part of the work was fictional and part factual. In accordance with Army
regulations some chapters were reviewed before publication by the Office of
Information, Department of the Army. No objection was made to the
material on security grounds, but it was concluded that some passages pertaining
to General Douglas MacArthur violated the "policy" and "propriety" pro-
visions of the Army regulations. Accordingly, the accused was refused clearance
for publication. A series of talks between Voorhees and Office of Information
representatives failed to produce agreement on revisions satisfactory to the latter.
The accused became convinced that "individual personal reactions were the
governing factors" in the objection to his work. Since he did not agree with
the "restrictive interpretation" of the Office of Information, he authorized
publication of his work without clearance from it. Shortly thereafter he was
ordered to withdraw his manuscript, and to withhold publication until it had
received clearance. The order was disobeyed. Charges were filed against the
accused, two of which alleged that he willfully disobeyed the order to withdraw
the manuscript, and that he willfully disobeyed the regulation requiring prior
Army clearance. The charges were referred to a general court-martial for trial.
Colonel Voorhees was convicted and sentenced to dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of all pay and allowances. The conviction was affirmed on inter-
mediate appellate review, and the case came before the Court of Military
Appeals on petition of the accused. Each judge wrote a separate opinion in
which he noted differences of approach to the problems before the Court, but
all agreed on the fundamental principle that, subject to the necessities of the
military community, persons in the armed forces had the right to speak and write
as they pleased. In the principal opinion I referred to the question in the
following language: 1
Plainly AR-360-5 imposes restrictions on the free expression of
ideas by Army personnel. The question then is whether those
limitations set out in the regulation constitute an illegal departure
from the Constitutional prohibition on legislation 'abridging the
freedom of speech,' which is contained in the First Amendment.
The inherent regard of the Court of Military Appeals for liberty of ex-
pression was made evident in a case that came before it which, at first reading,
seems removed from the area of free speech. 2 There the accused, a basic air-
man, attended a squadron party held at the officers' club. Lieutenant Tipton,
29 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
30 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 16 G.M.R. 83 (1954).
31 United States v. Voorhees, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 521, 16 C.M.R. 83 (1954).
32 United States v. Noriega, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 196, 21 C.M.R. 322 (1956)
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the squadron transportation officer, acted as bartender. He worked stripped to
the waist, and dispensed beer as rapidly as he could. Noriega, the accused,
partook freely of the dispensations. In due course, he became aggressive and
threatening. Some of his fellow airmen started to remove him from the premises,
but they were stopped and ordered to let the accused "get a couple more drinks."
After a time Noriega appeared at the bar; he assumed a stance made famous by
John L. Sullivan of prize fight fame and remarked "Hey Tip, let's fall out on
the green." Lieutenant Tipton walked away without rejoinder. The squadron
commander witnessed the incident. He called the Air Police and Noriega was
locked up in the base stockade. Later he was tried and convicted of disrespect
toward Lieutenant Tipton and was sentenced to partial forfeiture of pay, and to
a bad conduct discharge. The findings of guilty were set aside by the Court
of Military Appeals and the charge was ordered dismissed. A majority of the
court held that under the circumstances the accused's remarks and acts did not
constitute disrespect to a superior officer. At the core of the decision, is a
reconciliation of the right of the individual to speak freely within the necessities
of military life.
Another interesting case in which the Court of Military Appeals forth-
rightly struck down an unreasonable curb on freedom of speech is United States
v. Wysong,3" Wysong was a Sergeant First Class in the Army. While he was
away from home, his wife and step-daughter purportedly engaged in improper
conduct with members of his company. The alleged misconduct became the
subject of an official investigation. Wysong began to interview persons who were
called as witnesses in the investigation, and purportedly threatened them. As a
result, the Commander called him to his office and ordered him not to "talk to
or speak with any of the men in the company concerned with the investigation,
except in the line of duty." Wysong disobeyed the order and talked to some
witnesses. Charges were filed against him for willful disobedience of the order,
and he was found guilty by a general court-martial. The Court of Military
Appeals reversed the conviction and dismissed the charge. Writing for a unan-
imous court Judge Ferguson said:
Unquestionably the order severely restricted the accused's freedom
of speech. It not only restrained him from communicating with
certain persons on duty but off duty as well. In addition, the
order is framed in such a manner that a literal reading could be
interpreted to prohibit the simple exchange of pleasantries between
the accused and those "concerned" with the investigation.
Another defect in the order is that of vagueness and indefiniteness
in failing to specify the particular persons "concerned" with the
investigation. Such an order might well have extended to the
entire company; . . . We hold, therefore, that the order in ques-
tion was illegal and consequently unenforceable ....
While we fully appreciate the purpose sought to be achieved by
the issuance of this order, we cannot place our seal of approval
upon an order which is so broad as to practically prevent all speech
- except in line of duty - regardless of the laudable motives
intended.
33 9 U.S.C.M.A. 249, 26 C.M.R. 29 (1958).
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Freedom of Action
One of the principal consequences of military service is the severe restriction
on the individual's freedom of action. In or out of uniform, military personnel
are subject to general rules of conduct and specific orders which materially
narrow the range of permissible conduct in comparison with that 6f the civilian.
To take two simple examples, a civilian, during a week end away from his em-
ployment, may travel as far as his time and money permit; military personnel
normally are not allowed to go beyond a specific zone when not on duty.
Similarly, a civilian generally can eat what and as much as his fancy and purse
allow, but body weight in the military, beyond appropriate limits set by the
commander, can have serious consequences, including disciplinary punishment. 4
The Court of Military Appeals has shown that it is fully aware of the problem
of balancing the individual's freedom of action against the necessities of military
life. In a number of cases it has spelled out general rules of guidance which
reflect the fundamental American principle of protecting the individual against
arbitrary and capricious action of constituted authority.
In United States v. Milldebrandt,"5 the Court of Military Appeals was
faced with a question affecting freedom of action by the individual while away
from his military duty station. It struck down as too pervasive, a restraint upon
his freedom by his commanding officer.
The accused, a clerk in the Navy, was in difficult financial straits. To obtain
some extra money he applied for a 30-day leave, during which time he hoped to
secure civilian employment. The application was granted, but because the
accused's financial problems were already the subject of official concern, the
accused was ordered to report all his financial transactions at stated intervals.
When the first report was not received as directed, the accused was ordered back
to his command. On his return he was charged with willful disobedience of a
lawful command, and tried by a special court-martial which found him guilty
and imposed a sentence extending to a bad conduct discharge. On review, a
board of review dismissed the charge on the ground that the order to report
financial dealings was inconsistent with the accused's leave status and was, there-
fore, illegal.
Under the provisions of Article 67(b)2 of the Uniform Code, The Judge
Advocate General of the Navy certified the case to the Court of Military Appeals
for determination of the legal correctness of the board's decision. Writing the
principal opinion for the Court, Judge Latimer said that a commanding officer
could not order a member of his command "to make all facets of his personal
dealings public" because it would subject the accused to punishment for failing
"to disclose information of a confidential or incriminating nature." The order
was so "all inclusive" as to be legally unenforceable. Judge Latimer went on
to say that a person on leave "ought not to be subject to orders requiring him
to perform strictly military duties unless their performance is compelled by the
presence of some grave danger or unusual circumstance." He pointed out that
34 Certain aspects of a "fat boy" weight-reducing program were before the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals in United States v. Shepherd, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 90, 25 C.M.R. 352 (1958).
35 8 U.S.C.M.A. 635, 25 C.M.R. 139 (1958).
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the order in issue was not required by military necessity or discipline. Although
I had reservations about some of the statements in the principal opinion, I fully
agreed that the order was invalid. In part I said:
Persons in the military service are neither puppets nor robots. They
are not subject to the willy-nilly push or pull of a capricious
superior, at least as far as trial and punishment by court-martial
is concerned. In that area they are human beings endowed with
legal and personal rights which are not subject to military order.
Congress left no room for doubt about that. It did not say that
the violation of any order was punishable by court-martial, but only
that the violation of a lawful order was. Article 92, Uniform Code
of Military Justice, 10 USC § 892.
The legality of an order is not determined solely by its source. Con-
sideration must also be given to its content. If an order imposes
a limitation on a personal right, it must appear that it is "reason-
ably necessary to safeguard and protect the morale, discipline and
usefulness of the members of a command and . . . directly con-
nected with the maintenance of good order in thp services." United
States v. Martin, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 674, 676, 5 C.M.R. 102. I suppose
that no one would doubt the invalidity of an order which directs
military personnel who purchase an automobile to buy only from
a particular manufacturer or the illegality of an order which re-
quires military personnel who telephone family or friends by long
distance to call on a person to person basis, instead of station to
station. In cases of this kind, we must look closely to the con-
nection between the personal act required by the order, and the
needs of the military service.
Early in the term following the Milldebrandt case the court was called upon to
review another situation in which the legality of a command restriction on
individual liberty was the point in issue. Again the court was required to adjust
the delicate balance between military authority and personal freedom.
Paul S. Nation, Jr., was a seaman apprentice in the Navy. He was
stationed at an American naval base in the Philippine Islands. While there he
met a native girl and began to court her. About eleven months later, they
decided to marry. The wedding, however, had to await the approval of the
Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Phillippine Islands. The commander had
promulgated a regulation prohibiting military personnel from entering into wed-
lock without his consent. The regulation established standards of procedure and
information for obtaining the required approval. It also contained a provision
to the following effect:
[The application] will normally be returned ... with the notification
that the request will be considered after a lapse of six" (6) months
from date of original submission, provided the applicants reaffirm
their desire to marry at that time. During this six (6) month
waiting period, the applicant must remain on duty in the area of
command of the commander U. S. Naval Forces Philippines."
Nation submitted his application. Six months and three days later, without
having received the consent of the commander, he married his betrothed in
Quezon City. Not long thereafter, he was brought to trial and convicted on a
36 United States v. Nation, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 724, 726, 26 C.M.R. 504 (1958)
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charge of disobeying the regulation. The accused appealed his conviction to the
Court of Military Appeals. The court held that the regulation, especially as
applied to the accused, constituted unreasonable restraint upon the liberty of
the individual. In part the court said:
If the regulation, which does not regard the entrance into such a
marriage contract of itself disreputable or detrimental to the morale,
discipline, or good order of the military community involved, had
as one of its purposes the avoidance of impetuous marriages, it
should have made some allowance for marriage of couples who
have known each other long enough, in the normal course of
events, to arrive at a deliberate decision to marry. For a com-
mander to restrain the free exercise of a serviceman's right to marry
the woman of his choice for six months just so he might better
reconsider his decision is an arbitrary and unreasonable interference
with the latter's personal affairs which cannot be supported by the
claim that the morale, discipline, and good order of the command
require control of overseas marriages.37
The Right to be Silent
Nemo tenetus se ipsum prodere is an old maxim of canon law. Translated
freely it means "no one is obliged to betray himself." The Constitution of the
United States embodies the essence of the canonical principle in the fifth amend-
ment provision that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." Congress broadened the right for military personnel.
Besides prohibiting the use of coercion or unlawful influence as a means of
compelling a person to incriminate himself, Congress provided in Article 31 of
the Uniform Code that no person suspected or accused of an offense shall be
interrogated or asked to make "any statement . . . without first [being] in-
form[ed] of the nature of the accusation and.., that he does not have to make
any statement regarding the offense." The failure to warn, as the requirement
of Article 31 is commonly called, also makes any statement by the accused in-
admissible in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.
In an early case, United States v. Wilson, 8 the court held that the Con-
gressional policy of warning which underlay Article 31 was of such importance
to military justice that "a departure from the clear mandate of the Article [is]
generally and inherently prejudicial." The Wilson case proceeded on the
assumption that the policy was so well known in the military community that its
terms did not have to be spelled out. The policy was reviewed in United States
v. Gibson." It was there said:
Careful consideration of the history of the requirement of warning,
compels a conclusion that its purpose is to avoid impairment of the
constitutional guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination. Be-
cause of the effect of superior rank or official position upon one
subject to military law, the mere asking of a question under certain
circumstances is the equivalent of a command. A person sub-jected to these pressures may rightly be regarded as deprived of his
freedom to answer or to remain silent.
37 9 U.S.C.M.A. 724, 727, 26 C.M.R. 504 (1958).
38 2 U.S.C.M.A. 248, 8 C.M.R. 48 (1953).
39 3 U.S.C.M.A. 746, 14 C.M.R. 164 (1954).
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From its very beginning, the Court of Military Appeals has been sensitive
to violations of Article 31. This sensitivity, however, has not kept the court from
insisting upon a common sense approach to the purpose and language of the
Article in determining its application to specific situations.
In United States v. Rosato4 the accused was stationed in Germany. He
was suspected of engaging in certain transactions in violation of the Uniform
Code. 'To connect him with the suspected misdeeds he was ordered to provide
exemplars of his handwriting. On the advice of his counsel, the accused refused.
He was thereupon tried and convicted of willful disobedience of an order, and
sentenced to a dishonorable discharge, total forfeiture of pay and allowances,
and confinement at hard labor for three years. The conviction was affirmed by
intermediate appellate authorities, and the case eventually came to the Court
of Military Appeals on petition of the accused. The point at issue was the
legality of the order to provide handwriting samples.
The Government contended that the order was authorized by the Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951. Its contention was fully justified by
a provision in the Manual to the effect that the right against self-incrimination
is not violated by an order to a person "to make a sample of his handwriting."41
The Government argued that the Manual was promulgated as an executive
order by the President, pursuant to his authority to prescribe the rules of evidence
in courts-martial, and, consequently the quoted provision was binding upon
the Court of Military Appeals. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the
Manual provision was contrary to the mandate of Article 31. "Certain it is,"
said Judge Brosman who wrote the opinion for the Court, "that if law enforce-
ment officials may not lawfully compel the product of self incriminating evidence
then in existence. . . these same officials may not lawfully compel an individual
to compose and deliver such evidence."
Some high ranking military personnel severely criticized the court for its
Rosato decision, as constituting usurpation of the power of the President to
prescribe the rules of evidence for courts-martial.2 It is perhaps not without
significance, however, that neither the Rosato case nor other cases in which the
Court of Military Appeals invalidated provisions of the Manual because they
were contrary to or inconsistent with the Uniform Code, ever produced the flood
of bills in Congress to change the law, which resulted from the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Jencks" and United States v. Mallory."
One of the principal difficulties the court has encountered in enforcing the
letter and spirit of Article 31 has been to determine the situations to which the
Article applies. The problem has several times been before the court. The
guiding rule has been that "a liberal and enlightened rather than a narrow and
grudging application of Article 31 [is] best calculated to insure to the military
40 3 U.S.C.M.A. 143, 11 C.M.R. 143 (1953).
41 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 284 (1951).
42 Rydstram, Self-incrimination Refined, 19 JAG J. 1 (1955).
43 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
44 354 U.S. 449 (1957). For a list of cases in which the Court of Military Appeals in-
validated or substantially modified provisions of the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, see FEIM,
A MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL PRACTICE AND APPEAL app. 1 (1957).
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the preservation of our traditional concepts of justice and fair play."4  But like
all rules, the rule of liberal application has its limits. Consider, for example,
a case in which a person is apprehended by a military policeman as he returns
for more loot to the premises he is in the process of burglarizing. As he is
apprehended, the police officer asks the burglar where he has put the property
which he was observed to carry out on his first trip. If the burglar tells the
officer that the property is in his car on the other side of the building, is his
answer and the property inadmissible in evidence against him because obtained
without preliminary warning of his rights under Article 31? In United States
v. Vail," the court held that Congress did not intend that a police officer catching
a criminal red-handed, should stop to inform the accused of his rights under
Article 31.
The court has also held that the warning provision of Article 31 does not
apply to a purely personal conversation. 7 A difference in rank may be con-
sidered in deciding whether the conversation is official or private; but it is not
itself determinative of the applicability of the Article.4" Even questioning of an
official nature does not necessarily bring the situation within the ambit of
Article 31. Thus, questioning a custodian of books of account in connection
with a routine audit of the accounts is not the kind of interrogation contemplated
by Article 31."
Justice and Fair Play
Striking a balance between individual rights and the power of constituted
authority brings to mind St. Augustine's words: "Without justice, what are
kingdoms but gangs of robbers?" In his provocative book, Fountain of Justice,"0
Dr. John C. H. Wu, former Chief Justice of the Provisional Court of Shanghai
and more recently professor of law at Seton Hall University Law School, tells
us that in the administration of law we cannot always identify justice with
truth; a matter may be true yet justice may demand that we not avail ourselves
of that matter to justify punishment of the individual. In support of his thesis
Dr. Wu refers to Rochin v. People of California,5 in which the Supreme Court
of the United States held that two capsules containing morphine which were
forced from the accused's stomach by pumping into him an emetic solution
which caused him to vomit and disgorge the capsules were inadmissible in
evidence against him because the procedure used was calculated to discredit law
and brutalize the temper of society. Speaking of the implication of the Rochin
decision, Dr. Wu says:
If truth were the sole consideration in the administration of justice,
one could hardly imagine more substantial evidence than, the two
capsules freshly pumped from the stomach. But here human
45 United States v. Minnifield, 9 U.S.O.M.A. 373, 379, 26 C.M.R. 153 (1958).
46 11 U.S.C.M.A. 134, 28 C.M.R. 358 (1960).
47 United States v. Schilling, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 482, 22 C.M.R. 272 (1957).
48 United States v. Dandaneau, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 462, 18 C.M.R. 86 (1955).
49 United States v. Hopkins, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 519, 22 C.M.R. 309 (1957).
50 Wu, FOUNTAIN OF JUSTICE: A STUDY IN NATURAL LAw (1955).
51 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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dignity and other values are involved which clamor for recognition
and override even the interests of crime detection. 52
A situation similar to the Rochin case was presented to the Court of Military
Appeals in United States v. Williamson." The accused was stationed in Japan.
One evening he consumed a considerable amount of alcohol, and then went to
the home of a Japanese national where he was given an injection with a hypo-
dermic needle. The accused lapsed into a coma. The Japanese became
alarmed at his "condition and called the military authorities. Taken to an Army
hospital, the accused was examined by a military doctor. While still uncon-
scious, a specimen of urine was extracted from him by means of a tubular
instrument known as a catheter, which was inserted into the urethra. Analysis
of the urine specimen disclosed the presence of morphine. As a result, the
accused was charged, tried and convicted of wrongful use of narcotics. Event-
ually, the case came to the Court of Military Appeals. With the author dis-
senting, a majority of the court held that under the circumstances of the
particular case the results of the urine analysis were admissible in evidence.
However, Judge Brosman joined the author in holding that "evidence obtained
... by use of a catheter and over [the accused's] protest [infringes] fundamental
standards of decency in law enforcement." 4  Parenthetically, it is worth noting
that the court later held that an order to a person suspected of using narcotics
to provide a urine specimen for test purposes is illegal, in that it violates the
provisions of Article 31 of the Uniform Code.5"
Whatever we may consider as the generating source of justice and fair
play, we recognize their existence and essentiality in the administration of the
law. A half-century ago Justice Harlan of the United States Supreme Court
observed in a criminal case that "the courts have rarely, if ever, felt themselves
so restrained by technical rules that they could not find some remedy, con-
sistent with the law, for acts, whether done by governments or by individual
persons that violated natural justice."56  More recently, Chief Justice Warren
noted that the concepts of due process come from our "American ideal of
fairness. 5 7
In many cases the Court of Military Appeals has indicated that the tra-
ditional American standards of fair play are applicable in the administration of
the courts-martial system. Thus, it has held that a policy directive of superior
authority cannot be introduced into evidence in a court-martial, since there is
grave risk that the policy would influence the court members to adjudge a
sentence in accordance with its dictates, rather than one based upon the evi-
dence and the individual conscience of each member. 8 Similarly, the court has
held that after conviction by court-martial, the accused is entitled to an op-
52 Wu, op. cit. supra note 50, at 244.
53 4 U.S.C.M.A. 320, 15 C.M.R. 320 (1954).
54. Id. at 329.
55 United States v. Jordan, 7 U.S.O.M.A. 452, 22 C.M.R. 242 (1957); United States v.
Forslund, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 8, 27 C.M.R. 82 (1958).
56 Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177 (1910).
57 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
58 United States v. Fowle, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 349, 22 C.M.R. 139 (1956); United States v.
Holmes, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 642, 23 C.M.R. 106 (1957); United States v. Rinehart, 8 U.S.C.M.A.
402, 24 C.M.R. 212 (1957).
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portunity to explain or rebut adverse matter considered by the convening author-
ity in his review of the sentence. 9 Perhaps of the many cases decided by the
court, United States v. Haynes,"0 exemplifies the court's synthesis of the letter of
the law with the spirit of justice and fair play.
Haynes was an airman first class. He was considered by his superiors to be
qualified morally and intellectually for promotion to a critical and security-
sensitive job. To be certain of his suitability they asked him to take a polygraph
(lie detector) test and submit to a certain kind of interrogation. Obviously
they did not suspect him of any misconduct, and consequently they did not
advise him of his rights under Article 31. In fact they could not consistently
tell him, as required by Article 31, that anything he said could be used against
him in a court-martial, and at the same time advise him, as Haynes later main-
tained and the Government did not deny, that what he said would be treated
with the highest degree of confidence and would not be the subject of a
criminal prosecution. With these assurances of confidentiality and no prosecu-
tion, Haynes submitted to the polygraph test and the questioning.
During his interrogation, Haynes disclosed a number of serious acts of
misconduct. He provided the interrogator with the names of persons involved
with him. In due course, these persons were tracked down by law enforcement
agents, provided with official grants of immunity from prosecution, and called
as witnesses against the accused at his trial on charges covering the offenses he
disclosed in his interrogation. Defense counsel objected to the testimony of
these witnesses, but his objection was overruled. Needless to say the accused was
convicted. However, the Court of Military Appeals set aside the findings of
guilty. The court pointed out that the issue before it was the propriety of the
action of government officials. It noted that the Government's promise of
confidentiality would have prevented it from using any statement by the accused
in a criminal proceeding against him. Relying upon such cases as Sherman v.
United States,61 in which the United States Supreme Court said that "federal
courts have an obligation to set their faces against enforcement of the law by
lawless means or means that violate rationally vindicated standards of justice,"
and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,"2 which excluded evidence "gained
by the Government's own wrong," the court held that the methods employed
by the Government precluded use of the witnesses' testimony.
Conclusion
The Court of Military Appeals has a vital role in the development of
military law under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Constitution."
59 United States v. Griffin, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 206, 24 C.M.R. 16 (1957); United States v.
Vara, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 651, 25 C.M.R. 155 (1958).
60 9 U.S.C.M.A. 792, 27 C.M.R. 60 (1958).
61 356 U.S. 369 (1958), concurring opinion, Frankfurter, Douglas, Harlan and Brennan,
JJ.
62 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
63 One commentator has said that the Court of Military Appeals is:
perhaps the only court to have been organized in recent times for the pur-
pose of erasing a judicial slate. In creating the Court . . . Congress was
bent upon eliminating those aspects of the system which had drawn sharp
fire in the post-war period; for example, command influence, inadequate
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The court fully recognizes and appreciates that military life is different from
civilian life in its immediate objectives and means, but it has not let the differ-
ences obscure the fundamental fact that American life and law is founded on
the right of the individual to be protected from the arbitrary and unreasonable
action of constituted authorities. Like the Supreme Court in the civilian com-
munity, it has the awesome and humbling task of maintaining the delicate
balance between authority and individual freedom. As the court discharges its
responsibility, some may criticize it for adjusting the scale too far in the direction
of individual freedom; others may censure it for tipping the scales in favor of
authority. The process of adjustment is not one that can be performed with
mathematical precision. Criticism is, therefore, to be expected, and welcomed.
Judges are not free from imperfections. They can and do make mistakes. We
can only hope that what we do is right, according to the will and reason of
the community, and in the eyes of our Creator.
pretrial investigative procedures, inadequate trial representation, and over-
reaching by those members of courts-martial who act as the jury. Waltz,
The Court of Military Appeals: An Experiment in Judicial Revolution, 45
A.B.A.J. 1185, 1186 (1959).
